The international order that emerged after World War II is undergoing a profound transformation that no longer allows for nostalgic interpretations. Amitav Acharya, a professor at American University, participated in the series "What's Happening in the World?" organized by CIDOB in a conversation with Pol Morillas and Inés Arco, moderated by Lluís Pellicer. Casa Asia We echo his knowledge to illuminate the turbulent and uncertain times that are being experienced in the international context of the last decade.
For the academic Amitav AcharyaAccording to a professor at the School of International Service at American University, the Western-dominated system “is coming to an end or has already ended.” What comes next, however, does not yet conform to a clear pattern or to the traditional categories with which humanity has understood global politics over the past few decades.
Acharya invites us to begin with a conceptual review, which lays the groundwork for a new perspective on the world we live in. The very idea of “world order”—so common in diplomatic discourse—is, in his view, “deceptive.” Throughout history, what has been presented as global order has actually been the projection of regional systems with universal aspirations. From the so-called “Chinese order” to American leadership in the second half of the 20th century, major powers have tended to consider their values as applicable to the entire world, even though in practice these models have not functioned as expected or desired.
The end of the liberal international order
The recent—in historical terms—and amplified international liberal order is no exception. Often celebrated as a self-referential period of stability, its overall impact is more ambivalent when viewed from a broader perspective. While Europe avoided direct conflict for decades, other regions became the scene of devastating wars—from Vietnam to the Middle East—often as an indirect extension of superpower rivalry. Nor were its economic benefits distributed evenly: the growth of East Asia contrasted sharply with the marginalization of large areas of Africa and Latin America.
In this context where globalization has been gaining ground—for better or for worse—the end of the Western order does not necessarily imply a drift toward chaos. Acharya proposes rethinking the future in terms of a “multiplex” order, rather than a multipolar one. The concept, coined by him, attempts to analyze the new global challenges more broadly. It is not simply a matter of a different distribution of power among major powers, but of a more complex system involving diverse actors—middle powers, regional organizations, corporations, transnational networks—and where norms, ideas, and interactions acquire increasing importance.
This new scenario, still in status nascendiIt could be more inclusive, especially for those countries that have been left out of the previous system. But greater plurality alone does not guarantee stability. In fact, history shows us that neither hegemonic systems have necessarily been peaceful nor multipolar systems inevitably unstable. Acharya recalls, for example, the Indian Ocean trade networks before European expansion, where economic interdependence functioned without a clear dominant power.
Part of the problem lies in the categories used to describe the world. The so-called “Global South,” he points out, is a convenient label that groups very different realities under a shared experience of colonial domination. More than a cohesive identity, it is a construct “against something,” which limits its capacity as a homogeneous political actor. The concept of “the West” fares no better: it is a relatively recent notion, consolidated in the 20th century, and also burdened with a legacy associated with imperialism and racism.
New blocks or new bridges?
Overcoming this divide between the West and the rest of the world thus emerges as one of the main challenges of our time. Rather than reinforcing blocs, Acharya points to the need to build bridges and forms of cooperation that transcend these categories. In this process, certain actors can play a significant role.
India, for example, is emerging as a potential stabilizing force in this new global balance. Not as a hegemonic power, but as an actor with sufficient demographic, economic, and strategic weight to influence the international architecture. Europe, for its part, retains a significant advantage in its capacity to defend norms, standards, and mechanisms for multilateral cooperation, from climate regulation to technology governance.
The world that is unfolding before our eyes, news story by news story, “will not necessarily be more orderly or more peaceful.” But it may be, in Acharya’s words, more representative of its own diversity. The question, still open, is whether this plurality will be able to translate into new forms of global governance or whether it will give way to a fragmentation that is more difficult to manage.
